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
SECRET
CIA FIVE YEAR PLAN

Covert Action

INFORMATION BULLETIN

GUNBOAT

DIPLOMACY



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EDITORIAL

The Struggle Continues

Our unending battle with the Central Intelligence Agency and its friends continues. Many of our readers may have watched the television program about us on the July 8, 1979 edition of NBC-TV's *Prime Time Sunday*. We had no delusions the program would be fair and objective, and had decided from the outset to take our chances because of the national exposure which the show would afford. We knew that much of what we had to say would be cut, but we reasoned that much would remain. We did not expect a major American network to provide balanced coverage, but there were some points we hoped to make.

The cutting, however, was reprehensible. We were all interviewed for many hours over a period of weeks. One of us, a woman, was cut out of any speaking role. Moreover, we found objectionable and journalistically shallow the failure, deliberate perhaps, to say anything about us as people. Though we were interviewed at length about who we are, our backgrounds, and *why* we do what we do, the program focused only on *what* we do. Finally, the amount of time devoted to the assassination of CIA Chief of Station Richard Welch in Athens was astonishing. The scenes from his funeral four years ago were hardly pertinent. And, although our assertion that we had nothing to do with the death of Welch was broadcast, our explanation *why* that was so was completely cut from the show.

Having noted our major criticisms, we nevertheless reiterate that the exposure was significant. After the broadcast we were asked to appear on many radio shows throughout the U.S., and received letters and subscriptions from all over the country. We had no illusions that we would change the sentiments of those who don't agree with us; we took the opportunity to reach some of the people who do.

Of course, we also flushed a rat out of hiding. For the first time the CIA, through Deputy Director Frank Carlucci, stated that the Agency was proposing a law to "target in on people who deliberately and maliciously expose people that they know are under cover performing legitimate activities on behalf of the United States government." Putting aside the question of legitimacy, which is after all in the eye of the beholder, what about maliciousness? Is something malicious when we do it, but not when Jack Anderson or Evans and Novak do it? As Chris Wallace, the correspondent, pointed out to

Carlucci, "You're trying to legislate against private citizens using public records." Carlucci hedged, "It's not an easy issue because you get into such questions as freedom of the press and the First Amendment. It's also fair to say that the situation has become much more serious in recent months." It's an interesting doctrine; if the matter gets very serious, he is suggesting, perhaps we should ignore the First Amendment altogether. As another Agency "civil libertarian," former Deputy Director Ray Cline, remarked in testimony before Congress not too long ago, "After all, the first amendment is only an amendment."

At the time of the television show, it turned out, the CIA itself was busily drafting the "Carlucci bill," for submission to the congressional intelligence committees. What Carlucci later found out, however, is that the members and staff of the committees were shocked by his remarks on TV, convinced from the outset that the bill he was talking about was obviously unconstitutional. Such a bill would never get out of committee, and if the Agency wants it even to reach the *Congressional Record*, they will have to ask one of their hacks to introduce it for them.

That some sort of bill will be proposed seems clear. Senator Bentsen reintroduces his bill every year; there is nothing to prevent Carlucci from cluttering up the *Record* as well. That the administration is serious is evident from a remark buried in President Carter's speech of October 1 in response to the Soviet military presence in Cuba. He said "We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and methods of collection, without impairing civil and constitutional rights." [Emphasis added.]

For our part, *CovertAction* will continue to rely on the Constitution. We know, and Admiral Turner has admitted, that what we do is lawful. We, of course, also think it is necessary—to expose the anti-democratic and oftentimes brutal excesses of the U.S. intelligence complex. It is also clear that freedom of the press *must* apply to us as it does to all journalists. We think Congress will, perhaps reluctantly, agree.

The Delay and Our Schedule.

Despite our efforts to publish the *Bulletin* on a regular, bi-monthly basis, it has continued to bear a remarkable resemblance to a quarterly. We hope to rectify that with

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this single month issue, to be followed in a few weeks with the next issue, Number 7, November-December 1979. We will then be back on schedule. One reason for this delay has been the completion of our editing of *Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa*. This book is now at the printer and should be available in about two months. Numerous articles, many of them written expressly for the book, review the role of U.S., British, French, Portuguese, German, Israeli and South African intelligence throughout Africa. And, once again, a lengthy Appendix provides the detailed biographies of more than 700 undercover CIA officers now or recently stationed in Africa. We intend to continue this series of reference and research materials.

IRIS

In another development, the Washington editorial staff of the *Bulletin* has, with modest foundation assistance, established *Intelligence Research and Information Services, Inc. (IRIS)*. This project will provide research services, sponsor some outside research, and publish the results of much of that work. Readers who may wish to use this service, or who may wish to make tax-deductible contributions, should write to *IRIS*, 1016 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20045, for details.

About This Issue

In this issue we publish the complete text of *Director of Central Intelligence: Perspectives for Intelligence 1976-1981*, William Colby's 1975 five-year-plan for the Agency and the rest of the "intelligence community." Although much of the material is dated, and the failure to perceive trends in Iran, Nicaragua, Africa and the Caribbean is surprising, the document is a valuable research tool for students of the intelligence complex and U.S. foreign policy. Although extensive portions were quoted in the

Leveller, a progressive London monthly, we believe that for record purposes the entire document should be available to our readers.

We also publish Philip Agee's analysis of possible U.S. interference in Nicaragua. This summary of the many ways in which the U.S. government, and especially the CIA, will monitor events and move to manipulate them should be of value to everyone who supports a truly independent progressive Nicaragua.

The discussion of the invented "crisis" of the Soviet troops in Cuba and the continued fomenting of violence among the exile community comes at a time when the U.S. has been desperately trying to limit the influence of Cuba—for the next three years the leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement—and to fabricate excuses for a pervasive presence in the Caribbean—where other progressive governments have come to power in Jamaica, Grenada, Nicaragua, St. Lucia, and Dominica. President Carter and his advisors are dusting the mould off the Monroe Doctrine and, in the process, threatening all the independent progressive forces in Latin America.

Several interesting news notes, and our regular feature *Naming Names*, round off this issue of the *Bulletin*. Our next issue will focus on the theme of the manipulation and use of the media by the intelligence complex, and promises to be one of our most interesting issues to date.

About Our Masthead

Readers will note that we have revised the *CAIB* masthead. The editorial staff is distinguished from the Board of Advisors to reflect the reality of the situation here in Washington, where we who staff the office are responsible editorially for the content of this magazine. We appreciate the full support of our Board of Advisors, who continue to write for the *Bulletin*; still, it is we who remain responsible for it.

Sources and Methods

by Ken Lawrence

HOW THE CIA USES BUGS

According to Robert E. Lubow, the CIA uses insects for surveillance. In his book, *The War Animals*, Lubow told how the Agency used cockroaches to learn whether a certain man was visiting the Fifth Avenue apartment of a prominent New York socialite who was believed to be serving as a drop-off for a group of foreign agents.

This column will be a regular feature of the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*. The author will appreciate any tips, hints and suggestions for further research.

The CIA's technique employed a pheromone, a chemical secreted by female cockroaches which sexually excites males. In closely confined quarters, male roaches exhibit severely agitated behavior in the presence of the female pheromone, even if only minute quantities are present.

A CIA agent followed the target onto a crowded subway car during rush hour and deposited a small smear of the pheromone on the man's jacket while crushed against him.

(continued on page 7)

THE SOVIET TROOP CRISIS; OR HOW THE U.S. PLANNED TO PUT TROOPS IN THE CARIBBEAN

By Ellen Ray and Bill Schaap



Ambassador Kenrick Radix and Prime Minister Maurice Bishop of Grenada

Events in the Caribbean over the past several months, and the statements and responses of U.S. government officials, indicate strongly that the so-called Soviet troop crisis has been a deliberate fabrication, part of an ongoing intelligence plan with a definite purpose—the introduction of a substantial additional U.S. military presence into that area.

The issue is not Cuba, which is stable, but nearly all of the rest of the Caribbean, which is not—and where, one by one, progressive governments are supplanting longstanding dictatorships and other colonial and neo-colonial satrapies. A chronology of the events helps to demonstrate this point.

Grenada

Although resistance movements had been active in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Grenada, Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia and elsewhere for many years, the trigger which set off this chain of events was undoubtedly the March 13, 1979 revolution in Grenada which overthrew the notoriously brutal and corrupt regime of Eric Gairy. According to the *Washington Post*, immediately after the Grenada revolution the National Security Council considered “slapping a naval quarantine around Grenada.” This is a shocking opening approach to a government which wished friendly relations with the United States and wanted only to protect itself from mercenaries whom, it was rumored, Gairy was recruiting with the millions he had stolen from Grenada.

The new government of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop asked for military and economic assistance from the United States and was offered “\$5,000 now and \$5,000 later.” They refused this insulting offer, and accepted aid from Jamaica, Guyana and Cuba, after Bishop was warned by the U.S. Ambassador that any close ties with Cuba would be viewed with concern by the U.S.

In any event, it was clear that gunboat diplomacy was being discussed and tested in the highest circles of the U.S. government.

Widespread Unrest in the Caribbean

While the war in Nicaragua received the most publicity during the spring and summer, there was at the same time serious unrest in Dominica, St. Lucia, Antigua, St. Vincent, El Salvador, Belize, Honduras and Guatemala. In June and July the electorates in St. Lucia and Dominica threw out right-wing regimes and brought in considerably more progressive governments. In addition to Grenada, the August 27 *Newsweek* noted, “three other eastern Caribbean islands—St. Lucia, Dominica and St. Kitts—have had a change of government in the past five months. The turnovers were constitutional, but the electorate on all three islands is becoming increasingly restless.” “The U.S.,” *Newsweek* candidly observed, “would like to help stabilize the island governments of the eastern Caribbean, but that will not be an easy task.”

The Pastor Memorandum

Another strong hint of military involvement to come was the June 18 “secret” memorandum from Robert Pastor, National Security Council expert on Latin America, to the White House. The memorandum, which was leaked to the *Chicago Tribune*, discussed a meeting Pastor had with Henry Forde, the Foreign Minister of Barbados and, apparently, an accomplished gossip and informant. Forde was “extremely concerned about the expansion of Cuban influence in the Caribbean,” including the fact that at a conference in Jamaica, Cubans were even “trying to date the secretaries.”

More ominously, Forde apparently reported that Prime Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago, the most conservative leader in the eastern Caribbean, was interested in a joint coast guard, “to be a regional strike force to prevent a repetition of the Grenada coup.” Barbados and Trinidad, Forde allegedly told Pastor, wanted the United States to “send more of its warships into the Caribbean.” The authenticity of this leaked memo is questionable, as it was accompanied by a CIA assessment of Cuba, and appears to have been written in order to be leaked.

Philip C. Habib's Missions

Also on June 18—the date of the leaked Pastor memo—President Carter addressed Congress on his return from the Vienna SALT II talks, citing increasing Cuban activity in the Caribbean. Secretary of State Vance then echoed the statements, and recalled former Under Secretary Philip Habib to commence a whirlwind Caribbean tour. At the same time, according to the *Washington Post*, U.S. officials were allegedly concerned about “needlessly . . . giving Caribbean countries the impression that the United States wants to assert hegemony over the region.” This is an astonishing assertion in view of President Carter’s October 1 troop crisis speech clearly and openly asserting considerable hegemony over the area. Habib, a “special advisor and troubleshooter,” was assigned to “three or four global crisis areas,” and the Caribbean, according to Vance, was one of the most important. In the middle of August Habib visited Trinidad, Guyana, Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua and St. Lucia, undoubtedly discussing the upcoming Non-Aligned Conference in Cuba, about which more later. Habib’s stated purpose, however, was “to find a way to forestall future Cuban opportunism in the region.”

During this period NSC and State Department policy planners commenced a flurry of studies of Cuba’s role in the Caribbean and possible responses.

Nicaragua

Another critical juncture over the summer was the downfall of Somoza and the failure of the United States to gain OAS acceptance of its transparent scheme for an inter-American peace-keeping force for Nicaragua. This obvious attempt to bolster the moderate, less progressive forces in Nicaragua even as Somoza was clinging desperately to his throne was soundly defeated in the OAS. It became clearer to the U.S. that its gunboat diplomacy

COPLEY ROLE

The founder of Copley News Service, the late James S. Copley, personally worked out his agency's cozy twenty year relationship with the CIA and the FBI, exchanging intelligence information for scoops, harboring agency operatives on the payroll, and providing his fleet of newspapers with prepared articles at the request of the spy agencies.

After a brief hiatus, the Washington bureau of Copley News Service, in the hallowed tradition of its founder, has rejoined the intelligence field by being the first news media to float seriously the CIA's public trial balloon on what became the saga of the "Soviet combat brigade."

According to Rep. Robert McClory (R-Ill) who, swelled with pride for a home-district newspaper, inserted a puff piece in the *Congressional Record*, it was Copley's Edgar Prina who scooped the other media with his exclusive story in the Elgin, Illinois *Daily Courier-News* on August 30, "Soviet Combat Units Seen in Cuba." "In my view," McClory gushed, "Ed Prina's article has contributed to prompt action by our State Department and by our intelligence agencies." McClory inserted Prina's article into the *Congressional Record*; it appears to come directly from the CIA's classified publication, the *National Intelligence Daily*, three days earlier, along with a recap of similar claims by Senator Richard Stone (D-Fla), aimed at the many Cuban exiles in his constituency.

Stone had claimed on July 15, without attracting much public attention, that he had similar, though unconfirmed information, and had on August 10 written Secretary of State Vance about it without reply. When Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) made his speech in Boise the evening of August 30, he was widely reported as the first person to break the news about the intelligence "confirmation" of the presence of the "brigade." In fact, Church had been scooped earlier in the day by Prina. It is interesting that the "continued high level and informative reporting of these reliable sources," praised by McClory in the *Congressional Record*, appears to be nothing more than direct feeds from the CIA to Copley.

The Copley group, with domestic and Latin American news services, were exposed in 1977 in *Penthouse* magazine, and confirmed by Latin American media experts, as arms of the CIA and the FBI for two decades. The article, by journalists Dave Roman and Joe Trento, uncovered "no less than 23 Copley News Service employees [who] had worked for the CIA simultaneously." Copley papers also supplied the FBI with names and information on anti-war, Black Panther, and other dissident groups. Although the article suggests that the intelligence activities halted with the death of James Copley in 1973, some former CIA employees were still on the Copley payroll, and the connections have obviously continued.

would not be a joint venture, even with its Latin American allies. Excuses were needed for U.S. military escalation.

El Salvador and Guatemala

Within a few weeks of the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, top-level debate raged within the Administration, the intelligence agencies and the Defense Department over the resumption of military aid to the dictatorships in El Salvador and Guatemala. Both countries, long armed and supplied by the United States, had been sacrificial pawns in President Carter's "human rights" campaign—abandoning the aid because of alleged interference in their internal affairs. (This was a problem the President assiduously avoided in the case of major allies, such as Iran and South Korea, where human rights violations were at least as bad as those in El Salvador and Guatemala, but which were considered strategically more important.)

Viron P. Vaky, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, made an unpublicized visit to El Salvador, and concluded, according to the *Washington Post*, "that the situation there is rapidly becoming a carbon copy of what happened in Nicaragua." The hardliners of the CIA and Pentagon were clamoring for a greater military presence.

The Non-Aligned Nations Summit Meeting

During the summer, as a half dozen Caribbean governments changed hands, preparations were underway for the Sixth Summit of Non-Aligned Nations to take place in Havana the first week of September. For over a year, the United States' surrogates had fought against the selection of Cuba as host country, primarily because that honor included the nominal leadership of the Movement for the ensuing three years, until the next Summit. According to members of the United States Interests Section in Havana, the U.S. had sent thirty to forty ambassadors around the world to lobby against positions Cuba was expected to take at the Summit, and was exerting pressure where it could up until a few days before the start of the Summit. Sent to Havana especially for the Summit were two U.S. government "lobbyists," Jon Glassman, a hard-line former Brzezinski student stationed in Mexico; and John Graham, a soft-line analyst at the U.N. They frequently briefed the U.S. press on their view of what was important, although neither of them attended any speeches; and continually advised U.S. allies at the conference, like Singapore and Egypt, how to oppose Cuba's leadership.

Soviet Troops in Cuba

As we now know, the Soviet troop "crisis" was shaping up even before the Summit began. According to the scenario which was leaked to Senator Church, and later to the press, it was only on August 17, 1979, that U.S. spy satellites discovered certain Soviet troops stationed in Cuba engaged in field maneuvers which indicated they were "combat troops." According to Soviet and Cuban state-

ments later issued, they were not combat troops, but a training unit, one which has been in Cuba, at the same location, with the same numbers and the same purposes, since 1962, when the missile crisis was ended. The U.S. did not contend that the troops had been recently deployed, and admitted they had been there for at least several years. But, the U.S. insisted, it had just learned they were "combat" troops.

Senator Church led the attack just days before the Summit was to begin, two weeks after the great "discovery." He was a logical choice to be spoon-fed the information, because, with a somewhat tarnished and undeserved reputation as a liberal, he was nevertheless running scared against conservative contenders for his Idaho Senate seat in next year's elections. He was not only unashamed at being so used, he wallowed in the publicity which it brought him.

By the end of the Summit meeting, the Administration was cautioning restraint, insisting that the problem was not a serious one, but that some action by the Soviets was necessary. The "status quo," Secretary Vance remarked, "is not acceptable." This created a foregone conclusion, since the Soviets, who insisted in no uncertain terms that nothing had changed in seventeen years, were not going to redeploy their troops because the United States took the position that it had just discovered something fishy. By generating a false crisis, by making demands it knew had to be refused, the U.S. was left with any option it chose, confident that it could bluff its way home. As a side effect, President Carter hedged his bets on SALT II; if, as it appears, ratification is defeated, he can blame it on the Soviets rather than his own misreading of Congress.

U.S. Troops in the Caribbean

The solution, of course, was to take the steps that Trinidad, Barbados, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the United States' other client nations in the Caribbean had suggested with U.S. encouragement, an increased U.S. military presence.

(continued from page 3)

Later, CIA agents surreptitiously entered the socialite's apartment with a cage of male cockroaches. When the roaches went wild, the CIA concluded the man had been there, as they had suspected all along.

This exotic method was also very costly. Lubow says it once took the U.S. Department of Agriculture nine months to extract 12.2 milligrams of pheromone from 10,000 virgin female roaches. This would have been enough, however, for the CIA to repeat its surveillance trick many times. But recently science has come to the rescue of the buggers. This year a team of chemists and biologists succeeded in synthesizing the pheromone and published their results (*Journal of the American Chemical Society*, April 25, 1979).

The first public reports of the synthesis suggested that the discovery might lead to a breakthrough in cockroach



In his October 1 speech, the President announced the following steps: increased surveillance of Cuba; the creation of a "permanent full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West, Florida;" expanded military maneuvers in the Caribbean; and increased aid to the non-socialist countries of the Caribbean. The following day, senior defense officials announced that 1,500 Marines were being sent to Guantanamo Naval Base—a base the U.S. obtained by treaty in 1903, and claims, against Cuba's wishes, in perpetuity as long as it pays \$4,000 a year rent.

The steps look remarkably like the action which the hardliners were asking for since the revolution in Grenada. Gunboats are steaming to the Caribbean to intimidate all within their sights; U.S. troops, itching to intervene anywhere and everywhere, are poised on the periphery of the Caribbean (and the President did not dwell upon the troops already stationed in Panama, in Puerto Rico and at Guantanamo). It is hard to believe that U.S. intelligence was quite so stupid as the scenario announced would have it. It is far more likely that a sophisticated game plan, set in motion many months ago, has borne some fruit.

control. In a cover story, *Chemical and Engineering News* (April 30, 1979) speculated that the substance—called *periplanone B*—might be used to confuse the males and prevent them from mating. *Science News* (May 5, 1979) suggested the same thing. Although such research is continuing, W. Clark Still, the chemistry professor at Columbia University who solved the chemical mystery that made the synthesis possible, is much more cautious. He says *periplanone B* is only effective as an attractant over short distances.

Dr. Still was surprised to learn of the CIA's use of the pheromone. "It doesn't worry me too much," he said, when asked how his discovery might benefit the covert operators. "Very few people could repeat the synthesis." Then he added, "I've given away a number of samples. As far as I know they're all to reputable pharmaceutical houses." Maybe so, but if the roaches in your kitchen seem like they're acting a little crazy, you might begin to wonder. —

CUBAN EXILE TERRORISTS ON RAMPAGE



"Fidel Castro will speak at the opening session of the United Nations. . . . There are those pledged not to let him leave the United States alive. Frankly his presence in New York is an affront to thousands of Cuban exiles who ought not passively accept it, no matter how much sacrifice is necessary, no matter how many may have to fall, no matter how many may be blown up."

Ultima Hora, September 9, 1979.


This chilling and provocative public call for terrorism in the gossip column of a Cuban exile newspaper is only the latest outrage perpetrated by a small but deadly group, created and nurtured by the CIA over the past twenty years, and now, according to some, berserk and beyond the control of its former masters.

For two decades, Cuban exile extremists have been at or near the center of nearly every sensational terrorist action in the Western Hemisphere and several in Europe and Africa as well. Police sources believe that the elite of this group number less than 100, spread out within the exile communities in New York, New Jersey, Miami and Puerto Rico. But they are men who have known each other for twenty years, they are very hard to infiltrate, and with only a single exception they have with impunity bombed, maimed and killed on four continents.

Their latest campaign—blatant threats on the life of Fidel Castro who is scheduled to visit the United States sometime in October, coupled with leaflets calling for demonstrations at and around the United Nations—is a logical outgrowth of their hatred for the government of their homeland, a hatred inflamed and fostered over the years by the CIA.

Throughout the 1960s, and well into the 1970s, this Cuban exile network worked for the CIA and its associates not only in innumerable raids against Cuba, most notably the Bay of Pigs fiasco, but as mercenaries in the Congo and in Vietnam, as the footsoldiers of Watergate, and as hired guns for the DINA of Chile and other such secret services—all of them at one time or another creations and pawns of the CIA.

But even the CIA and the FBI are beginning to realize that they have created a Frankenstein monster. The U.S. government, quick to condemn terrorism abroad, is hosting one of the most vicious terrorist organizations on earth. The footsoldiers are dangerous, professional criminals, hitmen and drug dealers. They threaten not only Cuba, which is in fact quite secure, but also the vast majority of the Cuban community in the United States, who want no part of them, as well as U.S. and foreign citizens who may have business with Cuba.



From the early 1960's these terrorists perfected their skills under Agency tutelage—the use and handling of explosives, demolition and bomb construction, and, through the Agency's and their own Mafia connections, the arts of kidnapping and assassination. They have assassinated diplomats in Washington, Argentina, Italy and elsewhere. They have blown a Cubana airliner out of the skies in Barbados, killing everyone aboard. And in recent months they have launched a frontal attack against any contact with Cuba. They have bombed the Cuban United Nations Mission in New York and the Cuban Interests Section in Washington; they have bombed travel agencies for the same reason; they have bombed newspapers for sympathetic statements about Cuba; they have even bombed a pharmacy in New Jersey to protest the shipment of medicine to Cuba.

Their only real mistake was the brazen belief that they could kill with impunity in Washington—traditionally a safe haven for diplomats. The September 1976 murder of Orlando Letelier and his associate Ronni Moffitt in downtown Washington forced the Justice Department to move with some vigor against this network. The Cuban terrorists had demonstrated that the U.S. government no longer had any control over the monster it had created. Four underlings were caught and convicted; the U.S.-born organizer who planted the explosives, whose ties to the CIA were well established, got off with a few years imprisonment.

Except for the Letelier/Moffitt investigation, however, there has been little movement against this network. Weapons and drugs charges are routinely dismissed or only perfunctorily prosecuted. Perhaps, like so many of the people involved in Watergate, many of the leaders of this network know too much. Yet it would seem that too much is at stake for the United States. These terrorists are a threat to many diplomats at the United Nations and in Washington. They add fuel to the arguments of those who want the United Nations to move from violence-torn New York City and the United States in general.

The authorities have not moved against this network, even though more and more is known about them. Their line has become more public—and more frenzied—with the commencement late last year of a dialogue between the Cuban exile community and the government of Cuba. Despite the condemnation of this dialogue by the terrorists, it has resulted in the release of more than 3,000 prisoners, the granting of exit visas to all of them and many others, and blanket permission to Cubans outside the country to return to visit their relatives. The terrorists have been brutal; at a rally recently in Miami, one of the leaders of the Bay of Pigs Veterans openly threatened thousands of people in the audience. "We're not going to kill you people who visit Cuba," he said, "we're just going to make life painful for you."

In a recent article in *New York Magazine*, free-lance investigative reporter Jeff Stein has taken a close look at the terrorists, particularly the northern New Jersey community. On a side street in Union City, New Jersey is found the public headquarters of the Cuban Nationalist Movement, a group with such illustrious alumni as Guillermo Novo Sampol, who, in 1964 fired a bazooka from Queens, New York across the East River to the United Nations, and through a window when Che Guevara was visiting. Members of the organization have been linked to major drug dealing, and to almost all unsolved Cuban terrorist actions over the past several years. Although credit for most of those actions has been claimed by two groups, Omega Seven and Commando Zero, authorities are quite certain that both are merely different names for the Cuban Nationalist Movement. Indeed, Stein documents the overlapping identities quite well, and quotes both federal and local officials who agree.

With all this information at hand, why have the authorities not moved more forcefully? Is it really true that with so many longstanding contacts in the Cuban exile community the government cannot infiltrate these bands of terrorists? How can they chat publicly in their newspapers and leaflets about trying to kill Fidel Castro when he visits the U.N.? If it were any other group, if it were the Pope, or President Carter who was being so threatened, do we seriously think that arrests would not be immediately forthcoming?

At the Sixth Summit of Non-Aligned Nations, Fidel Castro said: "It is all too well known, and has been admitted officially in the United States, that the authorities of that country spent years organizing and methodically plotting to assassinate the leaders of the Cuban Revolution, using the most sophisticated means of conspiracy and crime. In spite of the fact that these deeds were investigated and publicized by the United States Senate, the U.S. government has not deigned to give any kind of apology for those vituperative and uncivilized actions."

Perhaps the U.S. government has ceased its attempts to assassinate the leaders of the Cuban Revolution; they have not stopped those who publicly announce they are continuing that campaign. Since the U.S. government, most notably the CIA, organized and trained those people, one would think that its obligation to capture and destroy the Frankenstein monster is clear. It should not be left to the angry village mob.

THE CIA'S BLUEPRINT FOR NICARAGUA

by Philip Agee

Months ago, when the Sandinistas showed that they could sustain their final offensive against Somoza's National Guard, an inter-agency working group was established within the National Security Council to monitor and evaluate developments in Nicaragua. Officers from the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA and NSA, and perhaps others from other agencies formed the working group. In the CIA, a Nicaragua task force was no doubt formed within the Directorate of Operations. These people had to predict the likely military developments, the political consequences of a Sandinista victory, and the chances of success of various possible American diplomatic and military initiatives.

Since the Sandinista triumph in July, the work of these "Nicaragua-watchers" has surely increased in volume and importance, but now with the additional task of preparing for clandestine intervention to influence the course of the Nicaraguan revolution. One can easily anticipate probable secret U.S. operations in Nicaragua.

First, some fundamental questions need answering. What do American policy-makers want to occur in Nicaragua in the near future? What do they want to avoid? What are their information needs and how can these be fulfilled? How can events in Nicaragua be influenced by overt actions through diplomacy and other means? What are the specific options for clandestine operations and their likely order of escalation?

The overall U.S. goals surely are to prevent establishment of socialist institutions inside Nicaragua, radicalization of the revolution, and an anti-U.S. foreign stance with attendant military and geo-political problems, including any Nicaraguan support to revolutionary movements in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. The key labels associated with these goals would be, as in Portugal in 1975, "moderates" and "pluralism" which, if eventually dominant, could prevent international alignment of Nicaragua with Cuba and radical movements elsewhere, and could allow penetration internally by U.S.-influenced institutions in the areas of finance, trade unions, media, culture and others.

For American policy to succeed, and to be prepared sufficiently for clandestine intervention, the CIA and other agencies need intimate knowledge of what is happening in Nicaragua. To supplement information from open sources and diplomatic contacts, intelligence must be collected

through spies and other clandestine means.

The CIA's Need To Know

The CIA needs to know the precise power structure within and between the elements of the Sandinista political organization, the Government of National Reconstruction, the military and security services, the revolutionary defense committees, and the mass organizations of workers, peasants, women, youth and students. The CIA and other agencies must seek to identify potential friends and foes within this power structure. Who are the actual and potential "moderates"? Who are the socialists, the communists, Marxists, radicals, pro-Cubans? What are the media organizations and opinion-makers who can be counted upon to oppose radical policies? What are the different policy proposals under consideration in Nicaragua and what are the internal divisions over these? Of special importance are any internal debates over tolerance of opposition, political organizing, media criticism, and future elections?

What are the main vulnerabilities of the government and political leadership, including foremost the need for immediate relief from hunger and sickness and the beginnings of economic recovery? And how can these vulnerabilities be exploited for the achievement of U.S. policy goals?

What exactly are foreign governments, particularly Cuba, doing to assist in the formation of new police, military and security services? What are the continuing developments in Nicaragua's relations with governments and political movements that backed them against Somoza, including Costa Rica, Panama and Venezuela, and what are the potential problems in these relations? What are the relations between the Nicaraguan government (including the Sandinista political organization) and organizations such as the Socialist International and the Christian Democratic movement? Who are the leaders of the other countries who could be enlisted secretly to denounce radical programs in Nicaragua? The list of requirements could go on and on, but without this kind of very detailed information the CIA will find clandestine intervention exceedingly difficult.

The CIA's programs for covert collection of information on Nicaragua continue, of course, from the period before the Sandinista victory. Besides the CIA Station in the U.S. Embassy in Managua, officers in many other Stations such as those in the Andean Pact countries, San Jose, Panama

City, Mexico City, New York, Washington and Miami have special assignments for intelligence collection on Nicaragua. An active program to recruit spies within the revolutionary movement and government continues. The CIA could have installed bugs in key government offices in Managua during the final days of Somoza as well as in Nicaraguan Embassies in key countries—no problem, given the CIA's intimate relations with the Somocistas. (The CIA officer who replaced me in Montevideo in 1966 came on transfer from Managua where he had spent several years training the presidential bodyguards.)

Encoded Nicaraguan diplomatic communications will continue to be decrypted and read until new, secure systems are established. Diplomats from third countries collaborating with the CIA in Nicaragua and elsewhere can be assigned to collect data on the new Nicaraguan diplomatic service as its officials take over the Foreign Ministry and embassies around the world. All Nicaraguan government radio communications can be monitored from satellites and stations in the U.S. Embassy in Managua and in the United States.

Information on Nicaragua can also be collected through the CIA's long-running efforts to penetrate international political movements and national parties, e.g., the social democratic and Christian democratic structures, as well as communist parties, the various Western trade union organizations, and many other organizations that can send delegations to Nicaragua. The CIA can send its spies in these movements to Nicaragua for intelligence collection, or they can try to monitor what legitimate visitors say on their return. The reports of all important foreign visitors to Nicaragua, and of the Nicaraguans with whom they meet, are a continuing CIA need. And not least, military and police training programs in the U.S. and other countries allow for close evaluation and possible recruitment of visiting trainees. The CIA can also enlist the cooperation of "friendly" security services of other countries for this purpose if necessary, or its spies within those services can assist extra-officially.

Destabilization Revisited

During the months ahead the CIA will have to prepare contingency plans for clandestine intervention for consideration by the National Security Council. If the revolutionary leadership in Nicaragua embarks on radical programs deemed inconsistent with perceived U.S. interests, the options are likely to include elements of the destabilization programs already applied in the 1970's in Chile, Angola, Portugal and Jamaica.

The immediate political goal would be to split the Sandinista leadership, create an emotive international "cause," and isolate leading radicals, falsely painting them as allied with Cuban and Soviet interests while against traditional Western, liberal values. Money and propaganda support for "moderates" and others responsive to American wishes would serve to enhance the local and international stature of leaders opposed to radical policies. Propaganda through local and international media, falsified documents and

other provocations, and exploitation of historical differences within the Sandinista movement can contribute to splitting the political leadership. The goal would be to weaken the revolution by fomenting new disagreements or a return to the divisions of the past. With a sharp line drawn between radicals, communists, etc., and "moderates," efforts can be made to align international groups and other countries against the one and in favor of the other.

Strikes in key unions promoted through CIA-backed local and international unions can impede reconstruction and create a climate of tension. Tensions and disagreements can also be fostered between the Nicaraguan government and those that supported the revolution against Somoza.

As the "cause" is established, mainly through propaganda promoting simplistic, black-and-white impressions, efforts can be made to foment popular disillusion with the revolution and radical policies. One obvious lever is restriction of relief and reconstruction aid, but conservative elements in the Catholic Church have been effective political weapons in other countries. Here also, association of radicals with Cuba and the Soviet Union through media operations can contribute.

Possible key issues in the "cause" would be an international clamoring for "free" elections and opposition political organizing. "Return to barracks" is another, as is "betrayal of the revolution" through the "substitution of one dictatorship by another." The neighborhood defense committees would be denounced as a political apparatus. In any election campaign, the CIA could make huge sums of money available to its favored candidates and parties.

A climate of tension, fear and uncertainty can also contribute to capital flight, worsened economic conditions, and an exodus of professionals and others of a frightened middle class. Operations can be undertaken to induce defectors and create refugees who can then be exploited through international media operations. Acts of violence such as bombings and assassinations would also contribute to the desired psychological climate. Perhaps the military forces of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala—probably the CIA's closest allies in the region—could be strengthened in order to provoke border incidents and additional tension.

Eventually, if the scenario continued, the CIA could seek to provoke "moderates" in the political and military leadership to oust radicals from positions of power. If this were unrealistic, impossible or failed, U.S. diplomatic efforts could seek joint intervention through reviving the Inter-American Peace Force proposal rejected by the Organization of American States on the eve of the Sandinista victory in July.

A Team Effort

The CIA would not be the only U.S. government agency involved in intervention in Nicaragua, and participation by non-governmental organizations would be needed. U.S. representatives on international and commercial lending institutions, as well as the Export-Import Bank, would

have instructions to impede credits. U.S. diplomats and military officers, in addition to the CIA, would try to influence leaders of other countries. U.S. businessmen engaged in Nicaragua could delay investments and other job-producing operations. And American media organizations would be important participants in propaganda campaigns.

Would any American President, given the difficulties and dangers involved in trying to destabilize the Nicaraguan revolution, order the CIA to go ahead? It may seem foolish now, but the direction of events in Nicaragua might well thrust that country into the 1980 political campaign as an important issue. If so, as with Cuba 20 years earlier, candidates fearing defeat might seek an international "cause" to foster a "tough" image before the U.S. electorate. The current contrived "crisis" over Soviet troops in Cuba underlines the danger for Nicaragua of this "false-issue" technique.

From a distance, one cannot know whether the CIA could find or create the "moderate" opposition that will

serve the U.S. government's interests. But the CIA surely knows that in its pursuit of American policy goals, it has many potential allies in Nicaragua besides supporters of the old regime. As traditional, non-Somoza interests are affected by revolutionary programs, the CIA may discover a fertile field in which to plant the seeds of counter-revolution.

In order to defeat any efforts by the CIA to foment destabilization in Nicaragua, counter plans must evolve now, while the CIA is making its own plans. The Sandinista security services should know who the CIA officers are in every country where Nicaragua has missions as well as in Managua itself. The officers with anti-Nicaragua missions should be identified. Appropriate defenses must be erected to minimize the efforts of these officers to penetrate and corrupt the revolution. Special attention must be given to possible provocations designed to cause splits within the revolutionary leadership and to undermine public confidence. Meanwhile, by strengthening the revolutionary political organizations, a greater awareness of the dangers should allow destabilization operations to be identified, understood and neutralized before they can be effective.



John Hoagland IN THESE TIMES

HOW THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PROJECTED U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES FOR 1976-1981

by Philip Agee

The following document is the full, 18-page text of The Director of Central Intelligence's *Perspectives for Intelligence 1976-1981*. A copy of the original, classified **SECRET NOFORN** (meaning no dissemination to officials of foreign governments), was sent anonymously to *The Leveller* magazine in London in May 1979. *The Leveller* sent a copy to me asking for an opinion on its veracity, of which I have no doubt, and *CAIB* now makes it available publicly for the first time.

The document was probably written in early 1975 although it carries no date of publication. Its reference to unsettled conditions in Portugal prevailing at the time of writing, together with its application to the Fiscal Year 1976 (i.e., July 1975 to June 1976), would place it during the first six months of 1975.

The document reflects an annual exercise by the DCI in projecting the problems and requirements likely to be levied on the entire American intelligence community during the coming five-year period. The exercise was initiated by

William Colby, DCI during 1973-75, and is mentioned by him in his book (*Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA*, Simon and Schuster, p. 362) as one of his management innovations.

Of interest in this document are Colby's broad analysis of world problems, his statement of American intelligence priorities (USSR, China, Western Europe, and crises—in that order) and his lamentation that recent revelations of intelligence operations were the source of some of his most pressing problems. Colby also cites the need for improved intelligence on Third World problems, on worldwide economic activities and on technological developments by other countries. The *Perspectives* are new evidence of the defensive, America first, world policeman role the U.S. intelligence complex takes upon itself in the name of our "national security."

Events in Iran and Nicaragua during the past year suggest that the problems Colby faced in 1975 are no less the problems of Stansfield Turner today.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE

1976-1981

Introduction

1. *Perspectives for Intelligence*, looking five years into the future, are issued annually by the Director of Central

Intelligence to provide general guidance for all elements of the Intelligence Community. In particular, these state-

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ments of perspectives are designed to stimulate early action and planning on programs requiring long developmental lead times prior to their execution—such as complex technical systems, language training, the augmentation of skills, etc. These Perspectives for 1976-1981 are intended to influence Fiscal Year 1976 decisions whose effects will be felt or results fully manifest only after several years. Near term guidance for Fiscal Year 1976 is provided in the Objectives the Director has submitted to the President, which included both Substantive Objectives (further articulated in the Key Intelligence Questions—KIQs) and Resource Management Objectives. The Director's Annual Report to the President on the work of the Intelligence Community will include comments on steps taken during FY 1976 to meet future requirements as outlined in these Perspectives.

2. The Perspectives open with a general overview of the international political, economic and security environment anticipated during the coming five years (Part I). This is followed by a broad statement of the needs the Intelligence Community will be expected to meet during that period (Part II). More specific guidance is given with respect to activities which should be initiated, or on which planning should commence, in order to meet those needs (Part III). Finally guidance is provided for implementation of "Perspectives" against major national intelligence problems (Part IV).

3. The Perspectives focus on major national intelligence problems. They recognize three important additional categories of problems, but these requirements are not extensively addressed:

- a. Continuing national responsibilities of a lower priority which must somehow be satisfied with limited resources;
- b. The requirements of civilian and military components of the United States Government for departmental or tactical intelligence support which often parallel national needs and also necessitate continuing attention and resources;
- c. Unanticipated situations or crises capable of posing major political, economic or security problems for the United States. Since it may not be possible to meet the demands of such unanticipated problems by a reallocation of resources from less urgent activities, some reserve capability must be included in our planning to give the Intelligence Community the flexibility necessary to cope with problems of an unpredictable world.

Part I—Major World Problems

1. *General.* The balance between the US and the USSR in the tangible elements of national power, while continuing to be marked by offsetting asymmetries, is unlikely to change fundamentally. Perceptions of the less tangible as-

pects of the balance of power—national attitudes, will, the momentum and direction of international events—may change importantly in either Moscow or Washington or elsewhere. In a situation of rough equality in intercontinental nuclear forces between the US and USSR, other national assets will gain importance as elements of the "strategic" balance of power.

2. While the Soviet-American relationship will still be the most important single factor, it will become less central in world affairs. Power will continue to diffuse, both because of the spread and changes in technology and because of the growth of interdependence, and issues not susceptible to conventional methods of diplomacy or force will grow in importance. The spread of nuclear weapons, the organization of the OPEC cartel and to a lesser extent the growing demand for raw materials have made coercive power available to additional states and non-governmental groups including terrorists. These trends, plus a perception of continuing abatement in post World War II security concerns, will work upon the cohesion of postwar alliances, which in turn will reduce the politically useful power of the US and the USSR. The United States therefore will be faced not only with a persistent threat to its interests from the USSR but also with turbulence and challenge in its relations with other nations.

3. *The USSR.* The United States and the Soviet Union will remain principal adversaries during the next five years. Their relationship will probably continue to be marked by an absence of armed conflict and at least public adherence, by both governments, to the concept of "detente." Disagreements between the two powers will continue to abound, however, in the application of this concept to specific problems. It is not impossible that these disagreements will culminate to a point where the concept itself loses credibility and public support in the West and hence, political usefulness to the Soviet leadership.

The Soviet leaders seem convinced that in the overall "correlation of forces" world events are moving over the long run in favor of the USSR. They will attempt to further this movement through a variety of political, economic, and subversive activities, backed with growing military capabilities. In doing so the Soviets will be cautious, trying to avoid confrontation with the US and foreign policies so assertive as to jeopardize what the Soviets see as favorable trends of US-USSR relations and world affairs generally. They will also favor the use of state power in the economic, diplomatic, and conventional military fields over the older revolutionary approach which, however, will continue to be utilized in favorable situations. The USSR will seek to keep "detente" as the leading feature of its foreign policy with the US and Western Europe for at least the next five years, largely for pragmatic reasons—i.e., because they think it offers them more advantages than any other alternative to:

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- reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation;
- local crises which could lead to general war;
- minimize China's chance's of developing anti-Soviet combinations with other major powers;
- obtain Western economic and technological assistance;
- promote the disintegration of US—Allied power blocs; and
- play a superpower role with the US with respect to world affairs.

The Soviets will have to deal, however, with a number of dilemmas as they attempt to square their long-standing preoccupation with military strength with the minimal requirements of a detente posture. In the field of strategic offensive forces, the modernization program now underway will give the Soviets larger numbers of more accurate missile warheads, improved missile survivability, and greater operational flexibility. In their strategic offensive and defensive programs, research and development is aimed at unique applications of existing technologies and applications of advanced technology based on theoretical or technological breakthroughs. Given present and planned US capabilities, we believe that the Soviets could not develop in the next five years a first-strike capability so overwhelming as to prevent substantial retaliation. However, in the conventional field, the Soviets will continue to build and modernize their ground, naval, and air forces for theater warfare along the periphery of the USSR and for distant limited operations. These programs will increase a variety of Soviet capabilities and strain the credibility of Soviet professions of peaceful intent. The Soviets are not likely to be substantially restrained by arms control arrangements, although for political imagery they will espouse a variety of disarmament proposals.

The USSR will continue to see China as a major hostile competitor and will expend considerable foreign policy support in a global struggle with the Chinese for influence and leverage, probing meanwhile for elements in the Chinese leadership succession sympathetic to less hostile, more pragmatic Sino-Soviet relations.

In its economic policy, Moscow will continue to give high priority to the kinds of growth which increase national power and facilitate its projection abroad. Domestically, however, pressures will grow for modernizing reforms of the Soviet economic system, particularly its administrative structure. As has been the case elsewhere in Eastern Europe (e.g., Czechoslovakia), reforms which serve the managerial benefits of some type of demand system could have implications for liberalizing other areas of Soviet life, and will accordingly encounter powerful resistance. Prolonged detente could threaten to erode the pervasive authority of the Communist Party over the Soviet populace. But these are long-standing and chronic problems, and over the next five years the regime is quite capable of resisting unwanted changes in the essentials of the Soviet domestic system.

A key intelligence focus over the next five years will be the Soviet leadership succession, as Brezhnev and the other aging seniors leave the political scene and their replacements consolidate power. Both the new leadership's policy modifications and the relative smoothness or turmoil of the succession process will have implications for bilateral relations with the US and the Soviet stance abroad generally, as well as for domestic Soviet priorities and the Party management of the country. While the odds heavily favor continuity, Soviet politics are so centralized—and so secretive—that significant change under a new leadership cannot be wholly excluded.

4. *The People's Republic of China.* China is already in a period of leadership transition, moving toward a post-Mao collegium. The succession could see an initial collegial unity followed by an aggressive, xenophobic leader. Alternatively, the initial period could be followed by the emergence of openly contesting military, Party, and provincial elements. For planning purposes, however, it would seem most appropriate to assume that the follow-on leadership in China will maintain the unity and authoritarian discipline imposed by the Communist Party, that it will be primarily concerned with internal stability and unity in meeting the social and economic problems within China, and that it will retain a mistrustful attitude toward the outside world and a particular suspicion of countries on its periphery.

China will continue gradually to develop its strategic forces and will present an increasingly serious retaliatory threat to the Soviet Union. By 1980, it will have the capability of threatening the United States with a demonstration (or desperation) strike by a small number of ICBMs and possibly SLBMs. China will maintain large general purpose forces capable of operations on its periphery, and the gap between Chinese military might and that of its neighbors (other than the USSR) will probably widen. China will be unlikely to commit its forces, however, in the absence of major provocation or concern, but given China's sensitivity regarding its Southern Marches, ambitious North Vietnamese behavior or Taiwan's procurement of nuclear weapons over the next five years could generate what the Chinese might regard as sufficient provocation, particularly if either party appeared to be becoming a Soviet ally.

Internally, China will continue its agriculture-focused economic programs that are essential to keeping food supplies abreast of population. These programs will nevertheless enable industry to expand capacity and output selectively and permit some modest modernization of the defense establishment. Internationally, China will endeavor to become the ideological leader of the developing countries. It will participate in aid programs and similar political gestures and will increase its influence but will not succeed in establishing substantial authority over develop-

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ing countries. China may become a significant producer and exporter of oil by 1980 and problems could arise in conflicting off-shore oil claims.

The chances of major change in the Sino-Soviet relationship during the next five years are small. Nevertheless, the consequences of the present hostility have been so important to Asia and to the US that even a moderate improvement would alter the foreign policy calculations in numerous capitals; obviously, outright military conflict would be a critical world event. Changes in either direction will almost certainly await the advent of new men, but this is likely to occur within both countries during this period, and it will be important to collect information and reach judgments promptly on the proclivities of the new leaderships.

5. *Western Europe.* Both the more stable and developed states of North Europe and the more fragile and volatile nations of the Southern Tier are undergoing critical changes. Uncertainties abound and the results are not foreordained; some of the determining factors lie within the control of the nations concerned, while others are international in dimension. US policy will be one variable in determining the course of events; in some respects it might be decisive, in others more marginal in impact. In some respects events are working to diminish US influence (measured against past benchmarks) while in other, less obvious areas—e.g. energy and economic interrelationships—it is being enhanced. But whether US policy is of decisive, important, or very limited impact, Europe's new uncertainties imply greater need for discriminating intelligence collection and analysis.

For the *states of the European Community*, the need is not so much for secret intelligence collection—though this will continue to be useful in certain respects—as for sophisticated analysis and interpretation of massive amounts of information, most of it from open sources. The effort will have to identify and assess new trends or shifts in policies and problems sufficiently in advance to facilitate effective and timely US initiatives or responses. And to be realistic, such coverage must take into account not only domestic directions and moods in these states, but also the interplay between the domestic and international dimensions—including intra-European affairs, the Community's relations with the developing countries and European relations with the East and the US. All these problems combine familiar dimensions with newer, less understood issues such as the social and political repercussions of hyperinflation and vastly increased energy costs.

Both the old and newer pressures will bear on such key European issues as Britain's political and economic health and membership in the Community, whether or not the Italian Communists gain a role in the government, and

indeed whether or not moderate government in the classic European liberal tradition can cope with current problems while withstanding assaults from extremists of left and right. The same pressures coupled with other uncertainties in Southern Europe imply serious difficulties for European defense as it has been known for 25 years.

The politically *more fragile states of Southern Europe*, at both ends of the Mediterranean, share the functional problems just mentioned—superimposed on peculiar new political dilemmas of their own. At one end, Portugal is already, and Spain soon will be, passing through an uncertain period of transition from long-established authoritarian regimes of the right to governmental systems which are not yet defined but will be very different. At best, neither in Spain nor Portugal will the new governments be as receptive to US facilities or as amenable to US influence as their predecessors. And it may be that Portugal, and conceivably Spain, will become inhospitable. The USSR did not create this potential in either state, but it has already encouraged it in Portugal and may do so in Spain.

The situation at the eastern end of the Mediterranean is if anything more complex. Neither in Greece nor in Turkey are the odds very high for a durable stabilization of internal politics which would enable both countries to approach realistically the problems of Cyprus and of rights in the Aegean Sea. Over the next five years, those problems will generate recurrent demands for US support, with accompanying pressures on US facilities which themselves are almost certain to be cut back to some extent during this period.

6. *Eastern Europe.* While Eastern Europe will continue to be under Soviet control, economic uncertainties and recurrent pressures for some loosening of ties with Moscow will complicate the picture. Poor in natural resources, the region is faced with a slowdown in economic growth rates which could have repercussions at the political level. The five-year period could see an explosion within some East European country against Soviet dominance, but Moscow would quickly reestablish its hegemony, by force if necessary, whatever the price in terms of other policies. Less spectacularly, individual regimes may find themselves able gradually to expand some areas of autonomy, primarily in domestic policy, while adhering to Soviet guidance in foreign policy and security matters. The passing of Tito could open a period of difficulty and contest over the succession and over the external orientation of Yugoslavia, a period that could be risky should the Soviets try to intervene, either to prevent a westward drift or to pull the country eastward.

7. *The Middle East.* This region seems bound to continue to be both volatile and dangerous. Even if significant progress is made over the next five years in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, considerable distrust will persist,

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providing a favorable atmosphere for those Arab elements rejecting a final settlement. A breakdown in the negotiation process is likely to lead to another round of war. As a further source of instability, the policies of important states are strongly dependent on individual leaders—such as Sadat, the Shah, Hussein, and Asad—whose departure could lead to major shifts in national behavior.

The US interests which are threatened by these possibilities are not likely to decline substantially over the period. Arab oil will not become less important to the US economy and will remain vital to our major partners. Meanwhile, the accumulation of oil revenues will magnify the potential for international monetary distortions. While there are important trends which favor an increase in US influence in the region, these trends will remain subject to sudden reversal.

8. *Japan.* Japan will continue to play a major role in international economic affairs generally, expanding its contacts and relations with other countries, including the USSR and China. Although Japan has a high degree of internal stability, it is feeling the social stresses of intense development and rapid economic growth (e.g., population congestion and pollution, among others). Also, Japan is among the advanced powers peculiarly dependent on imported raw materials and energy sources, and hence is both vulnerable and sensitive to changes in price or availability. Over the next five years, Japan will probably continue to strive to maintain cooperative relations with the United States because of the prime importance it places on defense and economic relationships. Differences over economic issues—bilateral or multilateral—could sour US-Japanese relationships, and the Japanese will be highly sensitive to indications of reduced US interest in their security.

9. *New Powers and Blocs.* OPEC's disruption of the non-Communist world's energy situation is likely to inspire further attempts at cooperative efforts by small nations to control other important raw materials such as bauxite and phosphates. Although most of these attempts will fail, efforts to form various types of producer's associations by these developing countries already have had some political effects within many industrial consuming states as well as on international economic and political relationships. Whatever agreements are negotiated between producing and consuming countries concerning the supply and price factors for raw materials, the political and economic effects for the international system—including the connections of the Communist states to that system—could be significant. Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Zaire are becoming regional powers and are playing more substantial roles in international forums. Aside from these, several nations whose ties to the US have traditionally been close will display greater independence. This will be particularly prevalent in the economic field but may also affect certain US strategic interests. Examples of such nations are Canada, Mexico, Panama, Australia, and Thailand.

10. *The Developing Countries* will present other major problems to US policymakers. The nature and severity of these problems will hinge in part on foreign, especially developing world, perceptions of America's ability—and willingness—to succor its friends, to protect its interests and those of its allies, and, generally, to play an active role in areas beyond its borders. The developing countries will be especially concerned with US willingness to support transformations, in their favor, in the international economic and political system.

Nevertheless, developing countries will be most interested in US reactions to events in Southeast Asia and Korea because these situations represent potentially dangerous circumstances. Of other similar situations, the Arab-Israeli conflict is the most obvious, but serious stresses could also develop in the Persian Gulf or in the Indian subcontinent. Additional regional disputes—between China and Taiwan, Greece and Turkey, and blacks and whites in southern Africa—could also threaten the tenuous equilibrium between the great powers. The newly rich powers will rapidly expand their military capabilities; some will develop nuclear armaments, however primitive. (Israel already has a nuclear capability and India has exploded one nuclear device; South Africa, Brazil, Taiwan, and South Korea could develop a capability over the next decade, as could other nations such as Iran). If the developing countries do not consider that the US and other rich industrial states are sufficiently forthcoming in closing the gaps between the developed and less-developed worlds, they will seek outlets for their frustration in assaults on the existing international system. The domination by the developing countries of certain international forums will result in increased confrontation and could eventually incapacitate these forums as useful international organizations for the industrial states. Also, some sufficiently angry developing countries may resort to covert actions in attempts to blackmail selected industrial states through terrorism—of a conventional or nuclear variety—or through covertly sponsored "liberation armies."

11. *Social change* will cause turbulence and possibly create power vacuums in a number of areas stemming from increased expectations and a perception of the growing rather than narrowing economic gaps between developing countries (and classes within developing countries) and the more developed industrial world. Areas particularly susceptible to this process will be the Persian Gulf, certain other Arab states such as Morocco, India, possibly Indonesia, the Philippines, and, in Latin America, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and possibly even Brazil. Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled by some authoritarian governments, particularly those benefiting from increased oil revenues, but they will have difficulties in maintaining themselves over the longer term. Such turbulence will also exist within advanced nations, as economic, racial, ideological, or regional minorities turn to violence

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and terrorism to press their claims against more and more delicately tuned and interdependent societies.

12. *The acceleration of events* will be characteristic of the years ahead. This will come from improved communications and transportation, sharply reducing the time available to reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international problems. It will also raise many local events to international prominence and inflate national or political pride, posing further handicaps to successful negotiations. There will be a resulting tendency towards breakdowns of overloaded institutions, shorter attention spans for individual situations, and a need for simultaneous perception and management of a multiplicity of international relationships. Such change will occur most conspicuously in the fields of science and technology, but the pace there will have substantial effects on the pace of sociological, industrial, and institutional change, with resultant political and economic impacts. Identification and accurate assessments of such changes and their effects will be needed on an increasingly rapid basis.

13. *Interdependence* will be an increasingly important characteristic of the world of the future. Intelligence problems will also be increasingly interdependent, requiring more complex models for analysis to give full weight to the number of disciplines involved. Interdependence will reflect greater national dependence on other nations but will also reflect an increased coincidence of interest among groups, industries, and services in all nations independent of national identification.

Part II—The Role of Intelligence

1. *General.* Intelligence will have to give priority to assessments of an increasing range of problems capable of affecting major American interests and, hence, requiring US decisions. While intelligence on strategy nuclear developments and strategic warning of military attack will continue to receive highest priority, the need will be greater in the next few years for assessments which anticipate and alert decision-makers to other kinds of policy problems. In an era of improved communications and transportation, of a contraction of US forward deployments of forces, and of acceleration in events leading to crises, the demands will be greater for intelligence which is timely, complete, and relevant to policy implications. Meeting those demands will be essential for the use of diplomacy, negotiation, and other benign initiatives to head off military confrontations or international instabilities. The central challenge to the Intelligence Community is in providing material which relates directly to the policy concerns of the highest levels of the US Government. To respond to this challenge, it is clear that the large amounts of information available will have to be submitted to analysis of the interdisciplinary type, so that economic, technological, sociological, and cultural factors can be combined with political and military

data to provide US decision-makers with a unified, complete view of the situations which demand their attention—or should demand their attention.

Essential constituents to providing such a unified view include: (1) the description of the perceptions held by foreign decision-makers of the major domestic and international issues with which they are concerned; (2) the presentation of these issues in a context which accounts for all significant factors that impinge upon them; and (3) the assessment of the intentions and likely courses of actions of these leaders as well as the capabilities of their countries.

In addition, the Intelligence Community is faced with the requirement to: (1) more effectively identify that which is significant from the large volumes of raw information, and to put it in manageable form; and (2) devise techniques for rapidly and accurately communicating to consumers the essential elements of foreign situations and the reliability of these assessments.

2. *The USSR.* The USSR will remain our major intelligence target. Intelligence will be expected to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities, economic activity, and efforts to acquire advanced scientific and technological skills to improve military and economic capabilities. It will be expected also to supply reliable assessments of Soviet political dynamics and intentions. While a small percentage of data for these assessments will become available through open exchange and access, the Soviets will try to keep much more of this information secret, and extraordinary efforts will be required to obtain and understand it. One specific priority task will be accurate and demonstrable monitoring of arms limitation agreements made with the Soviet Union. In the military field otherwise, special attention will be focused on Soviet research and development applicable to weapons and supporting systems which could substantially affect the balance of power. These will include antisubmarine warfare, ballistic missiles, satellites, and advanced technology systems. The greater political unity of non-nuclear forces and perhaps an increasing disposition for their use at least by some of the Soviet client states, will put a greater burden on intelligence to maintain a current baseline of information on such forces. It will also mean maintaining capabilities for tactical intelligence coverage of potential crisis areas and for rapid crisis augmentation of such coverage.

Intelligence will need to keep a running estimate of Soviet calculations of their overall foreign policy balance sheet, and to anticipate shifts in area of emphasis as well as in the general line. Particularly important elements in this larger estimate will be Soviet-US, Sino-Soviet and Sino-Soviet-US relationships, followed by Soviet leverage and intentions in Western Europe and the Middle East. Anticipating the relative smoothness or turmoil of phases of Soviet expansion politics, and the implications of this and

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any new leadership policy consensus will be an important intelligence task, as will the identification of significant reform tendencies or trouble areas in the Soviet economy.

3. *China.* China will continue to be an important intelligence target. The closed nature of Chinese society will make it difficult to assess any turmoil within the country, its leadership perceptions of threats to China's security, or threats China might pose abroad. The latter will become particularly important as Chinese strategic power grows and comes to include capabilities against the United States itself. It will also apply to Chinese political activities and intentions in view of China's influence in the Far East and its ties with and aspirations in the developing countries.

4. *Western Europe.* Next to the USSR and China, Western Europe is the Community's most important continuing intelligence target in view of US economic and security interests in the region and its importance to the overall relationship between the US and the USSR. The means Western European nations adopt to cope with the increasingly serious economic and sociological problems confronting them and changes in their attitudes toward integration and Atlanticism will be constant and major intelligence targets. Sub-sets of these targets will be Western Europe's internal political developments and foreign economic policies. Intelligence collection in Western Europe will be in great part a matter of following open political, economic, and military activities. The challenge will lie in providing useful assessments of their significance and likely future developments. Europe's economy will be a significant intelligence target not only in Europe itself but also with respect to Europe's relations with the developing countries and worldwide economic affairs. Finally, in view of the growing instability and pace of change in Europe, there will be need for greater attention to the opportunities (and dilemmas) presented to the USSR and other Communist states by European political trends; particularly in southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus).

5. *Eastern Europe.* Eastern Europe will be a constant collection and assessment target, in order to assess stability in an area where breakdowns in internal order or major divergences from Moscow could have profound political repercussions. An increasing need to tailor US policy to the specifics of each East European country will call for improved intelligence. During the five-year period, the most important intelligence target probably will be Yugoslavia, where a shift in international alignment actually is a possibility. Rumania's growing propensity to develop independent economic and political linkages to the West and China looms as another possibility.

6. *Economics.* Economic intelligence will increase in importance worldwide. This will include economic situa-

tions in nations having a major impact on the world economy and on relationships with the United States, such as the Arab oil states, major economic powers such as the principal Western European nations and Japan, major suppliers of food and raw materials, and nations where internal severe economic distress can create world problems out of sympathy or resonance (e.g., India). Economic intelligence of value to US policymakers is necessarily international in scope, including such topics as the activities of foreign multi-national corporations, international development programs, regional economic arrangements, and the workings of international commodity markets. In some cases, nations with close political and military bonds to the United States may become important economic intelligence targets, e.g., the states of Western Europe, Canada, and Japan, raising complicated problems for intelligence coverage. Defining the role of the Intelligence Community in meeting the needs of government for economic information, allocating resources to serve connecting requirements and consumers, and developing improved means of collection and analysis will be the most difficult and important tasks faced by intelligence during the next five years.

7. *Other Priorities.* Intelligence will increasingly be expected to warn of, and explain, new situations posing problems to American interests. For an example, intelligence will be expected to identify the causes of social change, turbulence, and political terrorism in developing countries, so that the component demands of these problems can be isolated, negotiated about, or countered with appropriate mechanisms. This may require intensified efforts on our part to understand and communicate the differences among societies, cultures, and national "personalities." Intelligence will be called upon more often to assess the threats and effectiveness of possible countermeasures to terrorist acts against US installations and officials as well as private enterprises and citizens abroad and, beyond that, the risk that some terrorists may acquire nuclear weapons.

8. The growing interdependence nationally and among disciplines will require a greater integration of many activities which in prior years could be handled in separate compartments. Political and social developments will be heavily influenced by economic and scientific changes. Situations in individual nations will be subject to major impact from regional developments and even from worldwide changes. Intelligence will also play a larger role in the international arena. Its conclusions, made available to other nations, allied or even adversary, will focus attention on latent difficulties, raise the level of understanding upon which more rational negotiations can be conducted, and surface long-term negative implications of apparent short-term positive gains. Thus, intelligence must extend its perception of new disciplines, must integrate wider varieties of specialties, and must look to a positive role in the international arena, in addition to its responsibilities to the constitutional components of our Government.

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9. A few of the major problems which will be the subject either of dispute or negotiation, or sometimes both, and consequently will be priority intelligence requirements, can be:

- a. Developments in critical regional confrontations:
 - 1) Arab/Israeli
 - 2) North Korea/South Korea
 - 3) Greece/Turkey
- b. Indications of a resurgence of other confrontations:
 - 1) Pakistan/India
 - 2) China/Taiwan
 - 3) Black Africans/White Africans
 - 4) China/USSR
- c. Rates of production, consumption, pricing of raw materials and energy sources, and international commodity arrangements as a means to share the burdens of price fluctuations between producers and consumers of primary commodities;
- d. Price and non-price restrictions on international trade;
- e. The international payments mechanism and the coordination of national fiscal monetary policies;
- f. National policies with respect to military sales, receipt of foreign military and economic assistance, and foreign business activity and investment, including policies toward multi-national corporations;
- g. Arms limitation, nuclear proliferation, and crisis avoidance, and
- h. Jurisdiction and exploitation in the oceans and on sea beds.

10. Much of the information that intelligence analysts will need to discharge their responsibilities will have to be collected by techniques and sources—some simple, some awesomely sophisticated—easily jeopardized by public disclosure which compromises them and facilitates the development of countermeasures to frustrate them. Thus an essential aspect of the intelligence mission will be our ability to maintain the necessary secrecy of operations while satisfying legitimate public interest in their legality and propriety.

Part III—Implications for Intelligence Planning

1. *The Planning Environment.* In the early 1970s, the character of substantive problems that had faced the Intelligence Community for more than two decades began to change. The change reflects basically the fragmentation of both sides of the confrontation between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds of the 1950s and 1960s, and the increased interdependence of the United States with the rest of the world on military, political, and economic matters. While Soviet strategic threat capabilities, China's military development, and crisis monitoring con-

tinue as our major concerns (consuming about three-fourths of our resources, annually), a broader variety of US foreign policy issues are climbing the priority ladder. Significant among these are international energy problems, the complexity of bi-national and multi-national political relationships, economic instabilities around the globe, the availabilities of important raw materials and the threat of extremist and terrorist forces.

The chief concern for intelligence planning in the present period centers on how we manage our resources to cope with this situation, given:

- a. Reduction trends since FY 1969 in our manpower and real dollars available;
- b. Increased demands for more timely and better forecasting in intelligence;
- c. Losses of collection sites on the Soviet periphery (i.e., Turkey) which dictates a requirement to develop alternative collection capabilities; and
- d. A more difficult climate for conducting foreign intelligence created in part by recent public disclosures of intelligence processes and activities.

Intelligence Community resource planning and management is placing increasing emphasis on national plans, i.e., the SIGINT, Imagery and Human Sources plans. They should provide the firm base needed to develop broader operating strategies and clearer resource profiles. A parallel emphasis is being devoted to continually improving our requirements guidance and response to customer's needs through such efforts as the KIQ Evaluation Process (KEP).

2. *Guidelines For Planning.* Even assuming an extended period of detente, the larger portion of intelligence resources will continue to be engaged against our major targets; the USSR, China, Western Europe, and crises. Thus, with no lessening of the importance of what our major Communist adversaries are about, events in both the industrialized and lesser developed portions of the *non-Communist* world are taking on new significance for US security and economic well-being. The likelihood is also greater now than in the past that localized economic, social, political and military events will interact with the real or perceived power relationships of the major power blocs in ways which will engage priority US national interests. All this has created a busier substantive arena for the Intelligence Community. Not only has there been an increase in the number of problems that require simultaneous handling—and this may increasingly tend to overload some existing mechanisms—there also has been shrinkage in the time available for the Community to recognize and alert policymakers to significant new developments.

Planning for the Community must take on a stronger corporate character. Intelligence program managers need to re-think with a collective mind our intelligence manpower and dollar situation, operational aims, and end-

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In the planning process, managers will find it necessary in some instances to modify drastically a balance of resource allocations and applications where simpler adjustments were sufficient in the past. Decision-makers should be ready to cut away sunk-costs in activities which result in marginal value. A key function of managers in building Community strength is to engage willingly and frequently with each other in cross-program tradeoffs to reduce unnecessary resource duplications and functional redundancies. Consolidations, from which lower operational costs and greater functional flexibility can go derived, should be encouraged. Resource applications must be brought into clearer visibility and linked more coherently to substantive intelligence requirements.

The business of intelligence may well require increases in budgetary terms, if only to maintain today's capabilities at current resource levels. Our first responsibility in this is to assure that cost increases, where they are deemed necessary, are prudent and defensible. The extensiveness of reviews conducted recently by both Houses of Congress in the FY 1976 appropriations process is ample evidence of what will be expected of intelligence justifications in the years ahead. More oversight can be expected from Presidential and Congressional levels—oversight which will involve a more thorough scrutiny of costs, management, plans, and extent of intelligence activities.

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Even though we cannot know with certainty what the future will be, planning mechanisms are needed which will allow us to review each step taken in developing a broader intelligence capability.

4. *Areas to Address.* A thorough review and assessment will be required of each main element in the intelligence process; requirements, collection, processing, production, dissemination, data management, manpower, and research and development.

5. *Intelligence Requirements.* Intelligence resources throughout the Community are driven daily by the intelligence requirements process. Today, there is a confusing variety of methods and vehicles (even language) used to determine and state requirements. Improvements are needed immediately. A better ordering of requirement priorities is needed across-the-board. Better definitions of requirements will be a fundamental step to overall improvement. The process must become more streamlined and interwoven throughout the Community to assure better, quicker, and lower-cost response to the intelligence consumer. The requirements process will be strengthened considerably by developing closer ties between producers and consumers. Better feedback is needed from policy officials along with better inputs from these officials; information and materials, that are not now being made available to intelligence. Anticipation of consumer needs and the timing of needs are becoming increasingly important in a world that is growing more complex. Greater focus should be placed on shifting ad hoc requirements and how to handle them along with standing requirements. This subject is being given special attention in the DCI's Objectives for FY 1976—but the Community should plan for continued attention and improvement in the out-years.

6. *Collection.* The pace of technological change increases the complexity of the target environment at a rapid rate and poses a risk that our present technical systems may have a shorter useful life. Scientific breakthroughs and improving foreign technologies increase potential by US adversaries to limit the effectiveness of our collection systems. Improvements will be needed just to keep pace with maturation of the foreign technologic environment.

In the SIGINT collection arena, there are both opportunities and problems ahead. Advances in technology are giving us access to additional areas of information (and improving our ability to select the wheat from the chaff therein) formerly beyond our reach. At the same time, changes in the target environment are depriving us of access we have been accustomed to. We must press the development of new techniques and systems and at the same time refine our ability to obtain substantive results from the diminished reporting of older systems, the growth of satellite communications, and continually examine ways to increase the productivity of existing collection platforms despite reductions in their access.

Intelligence from satellite imagery will remain essential in monitoring Soviet compliance to SAL and other agreements. MBFR negotiations, and US negotiations with other nations. Advanced imagery systems will be capable of providing a deluge of intelligence material. Use of this unique capability should be planned carefully to collect only that which is essential to intelligence needs.

Human-source collection capabilities will remain an important part of the collection process. Mechanisms are being devised at the national intelligence level, as well as the diplomatic mission level abroad, to improve the management, coordination, and exploitation of human-source capabilities. This trend must be pursued energetically. There is considerable potential for improved reporting from overt personnel of both intelligence and non-intelligence agencies abroad. Contributions of such agencies as State, Defense, Treasury, USAID, USIA, Agriculture, and Commerce can be enhanced substantially by more effective approaches to information gathering and in the reporting aspects of their activities. We need, particularly, gains in the interrelationships between *overt and clandestine* and *technical and human* sources. We must establish more *direct links* between our human collectors and our technical collectors.

7. *Processing.* This is still one of the most pervasive problems facing the Intelligence Community. Advanced capabilities in technical collection are still challenging intelligence processing techniques. Higher speed processing methods—rapid selection-out of non-essential material and faster ways to disseminate critical matter—are particularly important to SIGINT collection systems.

8. *Production.* Intelligence improvement will not be complete without a tandem development in analysis, production, and presentation techniques. Accelerated efforts are needed in information science research, automated data handling techniques, improved analytic techniques, and in the development of electronic tools that the analyst can use easily and effectively in the production of intelligence. These must be accompanied by equal stress on deepening the substantive knowledge of their subjects by analysts through training, area study and orientation, and language and cultural familiarity. Improved techniques in writing for the busy policymaker are especially needed and should be given particular emphasis in our training programs. Those officials whom intelligence should seek most to influence are those who have the least time to dwell on tomes. More effective procedures are necessary to evaluate user satisfaction and dissatisfaction with intelligence products.

9. *Dissemination.* The number of customers for intelligence will increase. Some will be customers of new specialties in intelligence, such as economics, science and technology, etc. Increases in the value and timeliness of production will also generate a demand for intelligence service to addi-

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tional elements of our Government which share responsibility for decision-making on the wide variety of questions to be covered by intelligence in the future. Demands will increase for more immediate (faster than the press) reporting of current developments from the field. Field analysis will remain important but should promptly follow with appropriate detail, spot reporting of a significant event. Lastly, we will have increasing situations in which intelligence must be provided to friendly nations, or even exposed to adversary nations, to serve as a basis for negotiation or monitoring of agreements reached. The dissemination of our intelligence must reflect these new demands and be conducted in a fashion which clearly separates the substantive material circulating from sensitive sources and techniques that are vulnerable to frustration or termination by adversaries. We should also intensify our efforts to downgrade, sanitize, and decontrol where possible, highly compartmented products so that they may be more widely disseminated and used. This will require greater refinement in distinguishing categories of intelligence which can be disseminated to designated audiences from those elements of the intelligence process which must be given greater, rather than less, protection in such a new atmosphere.

10. *Data Management.* Information and data masses should be made more readily available in a more useful form to all quarters of the Community. There will be larger volumes and increased diversity of information to be handled by intelligence in the years ahead. This will call for:

- a. A better appreciation and application by managers of the principles of data management;
- b. An upgraded data management system of computers, computer techniques, and communications capabilities; and
- c. Development of a Community-wide data management system and standards.

Before these improved capabilities can operate as a unitary system, it will be necessary to standardize intelligence language, data, and computer formats.

11. *Manpower.* Investment in new talent, training and career development, and exposure abroad may well have suffered in our preoccupation with recent reductions in manpower levels. The years ahead will probably call for different organizational mixes of Community manpower, and almost certainly, a greater breadth of expertise in manpower skills. Organization heads and programs managers will be required to formulate plans annually to:

- a. Train and familiarize personnel in new and better analytic methodologies—improve the balance of Community skills to meet the demands of a changing intelligence environment;
- b. Emphasize and accelerate training in foreign languages and cultures of nations that will be important intelligence targets in the 1976-1981 timeframe;
- c. Provide intelligence officers with better familiarity in matters of policy formulation, policy and negotiating

issues, how to identify and anticipate issues, and how to relate them to the need for intelligence collection and production;

d. Ensure availability of technical and academic talents and expertise on subjects of importance to intelligence in the 1976-1981 timeframe; and

e. Reassess existing manpower commitments against future rather than past or even present requirements, and place major emphasis on the former.

12. *Research and Development.* R&D continues to grow in importance in the planning and management of US foreign intelligence. Along with R&D initiatives already under way, the IR&D Council should concentrate efforts on:

- a. The prevention of surprise in technological progress of other nations—especially by our foreign adversaries;
- b. Identification of opportunities and potential problems for intelligence management to address throughout the next decade and beyond; and
- c. Surfacing topics and areas of research not included now in the Community R&D effort—topics that should be added to our plans against longer-term areas.

13. *National-Military Force Relationships.* Growing substantive intelligence needs call for improved mutual support between national and military operating forces.

In the development of new and improved national intelligence systems and related program decisions, the intelligence requirements of field commanders for reporting timeliness and accuracy should be taken into account. As national interest, mission, and costs permit, national intelligence systems should be supportive to military theater planning and operations.

Similarly, where mission and location permit, intelligence units that are organic to field forces should be supportive to the satisfaction of national and departmental intelligence needs. For example, combat readiness training should include collection and production against actual intelligence targets of interest to national-level users as well as to tactical commander needs. Steps should also continue toward improving the capabilities of reserve and National Guard units to take on lower-priority, longer-term intelligence tasks.

14. *Summary Areas of Concern.* particular attention should be given by planners to the following:

- a. Development of procedures, techniques and systems for improving our ability to anticipate and alert policymakers to likely future events which could prove injurious to US interests. New elements and issues on the international scene stress the need for a continuously sensitive, national intelligence nervous system—one that will be immediately responsive to warnings, tipoffs, and conditions of opportunity;

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b. Continuing reappraisal of our intelligence products—their styling, utility, and level of comprehensiveness to an increased diversity of intelligence matter and consumer needs;

c. Assurance that substantive consumer needs (rather than momentum of technological achievement and opportunity) is the driving force of investment in our expensive technical collection systems;

d. Development of intelligence operational systems for the future that will be less geographic-dependent or vulnerable to foreign countermeasures;

e. Program planning that is tuned to longer range concerns (5-10 years) and consistent with our developing concept of what the future will demand; and

f. Concentrated efforts to develop a stronger relationship between intelligence producers and intelligence consumers.

Above all, flexibility in allocating collection resources and in applying analytical resources must be enhanced. And, this must be accomplished within the context of greater intra-Community understanding and cooperation so that the total output of the Community is of the greatest possible value to the nation.

Part IV—Implementation

1. *General.* The Perspectives for Intelligence will be utilized and reflected in the following Intelligence Community planning and management documents:

DCI Objectives

Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs)

Key Intelligence Question Evaluation Process (KEP)

National Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendations

National SIGINT Plan

National Imagery Plan

National Human Source Plan

Intelligence Community Annual Report

2. The following bodies will be consulted and participate in the implementation of the guidance contained in these Perspectives, as well as the documents listed above:

National Security Council Intelligence Committee

United States Intelligence Board

Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee

National Reconnaissance Executive Committee

3. As noted in the introduction, these Perspectives are addressed to major national intelligence problems. The additional categories of problems listed there, which are related to national intelligence but not addressed in these Perspectives, will be implemented by components in the Community following departmental guidance.

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Soldiers storm the Presidential Palace, September 11, 1973. *Afrique-Asie*

NAMING NAMES

This is a regular feature of the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*. While we use the most current information available to us, CIA officers mentioned here may, in some cases, have been transferred. We welcome updated information from readers.

Chiefs of Station

The Chief of Station in Bujumbura, **Burundi**, since early 1978, is **George H. Hazelrigg**, born July 6, 1938 in Kansas. Hazelrigg was in Khartoum, Sudan, from May 1968 to July 1969, under cover as a political officer; and in Lome, Togo the next six months, with the same title. He also served in Kaduna, Nigeria from early 1970 to late 1972, as economic-commercial officer, though in actuality CIA Chief of Base. He was Chief of Station in Bamako, Mali, from mid-1974 until late 1977, before moving to the same post in Burundi.

Robert T. Dumaine is the new Chief of Station in Helsinki, **Finland**. Dumaine, born October 12, 1935, served in Moscow and Vienna in the early 1970s, under cover as a political officer. There are no State Department records of his whereabouts from March 1976 until August 1979, when he appears in Helsinki, replacing William C. Simenson.

We have located the apparent successor to Dean J. Almy, Jr., the former Chief of Station in **Jamaica**, and the first person to grace this column in our premier issue. He is **N. Richard Kinsman**, born August 17, 1936. Kinsman received a BA from Syracuse in 1958, spent one year in the Army, followed by five years of unspecified "government experience," presumably the com-

mencement of his work for the CIA. From 1965 to 1967 he was ostensibly a "program officer" in the Agency for International Development, and in early 1968 was posted to the Bogota, Colombia Embassy as a political officer. In 1971 he was transferred to Caracas, Venezuela, and in August 1977 to Lima, Peru, where he was apparently Deputy Chief of Station. Two years later he arrived in Kingston, Jamaica, replacing Almy, who had departed several months before.

An Agency veteran, who has spent considerable time under deep cover, **John S. Habib**, is at present the Chief of Station in Rabat, **Morocco**. Habib, born July 7, 1930 in Michigan, appears in government records as an "analyst" for an unspecified government agency from 1957 to 1962; does not appear in the records for 1963; from 1964 to 1971 is again assigned to an unspecified government agency; and from 1971 to 1973 was in some unidentified private job. In 1973 he surfaced under diplomatic cover, as a consular officer in Kuwait; in late 1974 he was transferred to Doha, Qatar; and in August 1978 to Rabat. In each posting he appears to have been Chief of Station.

The Chief of Station in Managua, **Nicaragua** is **Robert L. Fambrini**. Fambrini is listed in State Department records for 1957 as an "analyst" for the Department of the Army, rather well-known CIA cover. From 1957 to 1960, he served in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, as a political assistant, with an S rating. In 1960 and 1961, records show, he was not under diplomatic cover, but operating as an analyst for an unspecified foreign trade consultant firm. In mid-1971 he reappears in State Department records as a consular officer in Salvador, Brazil, this time with an R rating. These changes in rating (in 1973 he



reverts to an S rating, and in 1976 back to R) are another common indication of CIA cover. In 1964 he served in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, as a political officer; in 1969 in Guayaquil, Ecuador, and in 1973 in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, continuing the cover of political officer. In July 1976 he was transferred to Managua, as Second Secretary. Although more than three years have elapsed, reports indicate that Fambrini is still serving in Managua, to which he has just returned after a one-month home leave and consultations at Headquarters in Langley.

The new Chief of Station in Oslo, Norway, is **William E. Camp, III**. Camp, born December 18, 1930 in Ohio, served under cover at the Oslo Embassy from 1965 until 1970, and, although there are no records for him covering the intervening years, resurfaced as of late 1978 once again in Oslo.

The Chief of Station in Ouagadougou, Upper Volta, is **Gerald Thompson Sloane**, born October 5, 1941. Sloane served in Rangoon and Mandalay, Burma in the early 1970s, in Hong Kong from 1976 till late 1978, and appears as a consular officer at the Ouagadougou Embassy as of December 1978.

The Caribbean Task Force

We have been shown the roster of personnel who comprise the inter-agency Caribbean Task Force, coordinated by the Department of State. Two representatives of the CIA are listed, **John Gannon** and **Janice Brotherton**.

The National War College

One of the CIA officers whose full biography appears in *Dirty Work*, **Joel D. Ticknor**, is at present a "student" at the National War College, with a GS-15 rating (the equivalent of R-3). Ticknor is an Africa specialist, who has served in Burundi, Congo (now Zaire) and Ghana over the last 17 years.

Other Case Officers

Joseph W. Hartmann is a case officer in San Jose, Costa Rica, posted there around August 1979. In late 1976 he was serving at the Georgetown, Guyana Embassy. No other records have been found.

A case officer in Baghdad, Iraq, is **Whitley Bruner**, born August 24, 1942. Bruner has served in Lebanon, Yemen Arab Republic and Egypt, before his posting, in April 1979, to Baghdad.

James Michael Flaherty has recently been transferred from Rabat, Morocco to Tripoli, Libya. Flaherty, born December 13, 1944 in California, served in Beirut and Rabat before moving this summer to Tripoli.

Also now in Tripoli, Libya, is **John J. McCavitt**, born October 8, 1940 in Massachusetts. McCavitt served from 1967 to 1972 as a political officer in Rabat, Morocco, moving at that time to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where he remained till 1974. He spent 1975 in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. Although no records covering the intervening period have been found, as of at least January 1978, he was stationed in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, before the transfer, as of August 1979, to Tripoli.

The Chief of Base in Blantyre, Malawi is **Kenneth Leroy Hurley**. Hurley served in Lusaka, Zambia from 1974 to 1977, and has been at the Blantyre Consulate since early 1978.

Otis L. Hayes, born March 16, 1942 in Mississippi, is now a case officer stationed in the Embassy at Lilongwe, Malawi. Hayes appears as a "research analyst" for the Department of Defense from 1967 to 1968, and then spent two years in the Army, presumably under cover. In mid-1971 he appeared under diplomatic cover as a political officer in Monrovia, Liberia. From 1973 to 1977 the records of his whereabouts are scanty; in mid-1977 he appeared at the Lagos, Nigeria Embassy, where he served till his transfer, in August 1979, to Malawi.

Arthur M. Niner, Jr., whose full biography appears in *Dirty Work*, has been transferred from Tripoli, Libya to Rabat, Morocco.

A senior case officer in Colombo, Sri Lanka, perhaps the Chief of Station, is **Richard W. Rauh**, born October 4, 1934. Rauh first appears under diplomatic cover in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1964; in 1966 he was transferred to Jidda, Saudi Arabia, and in 1967 to Aden, Southern Yemen (now Democratic Yemen). In 1970 and in 1971 he served at the U.S. Interests Section in the Italian Embassy at Sana'a, Yemen, before moving to the Manama, Bahrain Embassy. In 1974 he appears in Beirut, in 1977 in Damascus, and, as of August 1979, for the first time leaving the Middle East, in Colombo.

Two case officers located in the United Kingdom are **John Charles Hannon** and **Rufus Stevenson**. Hannon, born March 2, 1938, has served in Nairobi, Kenya, 1969 to 1972; in Dar-es-Salaam, 1972 to 1974; and in Moscow, from January 1977 to December 1978; before becoming Second Secretary at the London Embassy. Stevenson, born November 26, 1939 in Georgia, served in Antananarivo, Madagascar, from 1971 to 1973; and in Bamako, Mali, from 1973 to 1975. From late 1975 till March 1978, when he appears at the London Embassy, records indicate he was at headquarters, in the Africa section, through it is unclear whether he actually remained there that entire time.

Another recent transfer we have noted is that of **Edward J. Carroll, III**, to the Kinshasa, Zaire Embassy. Carroll was under Army cover from 1969 to 1973, moving at that time to the Monrovia, Liberia Embassy, and served from September 1977 till July 1979 in Dakar, Senegal, before being transferred to Zaire.

NEWS NOTES

CIA DIRECTOR PLAYS SEMANTICS IN COURT

Yet another aspect of the ham-handed approach of the CIA and the FBI to the Freedom of Information Act and to the public's right to know was exposed recently in a Washington lawsuit.

The plaintiffs in Federal District Court here, seek to learn the names of the institutions and researchers who were involved in the notorious MK-ULTRA surreptitious CIA drug-testing program. Since "intelligence sources" are generally protected from disclosure, the CIA is attempting to define that term, as the *Washington Post* put it, "so broadly that it could keep all such sources secret."

In an unusual move, the CIA submitted a personal affidavit from Director Stansfield Turner. He sought to explain to District Judge Louis Oberdorfer that intelligence sources "includes more than simply those individuals directly involved in collecting and reporting foreign intelligence operations." He indicated that there are many other intelligence sources in addition to the "classic figure of a secret agent reporting from abroad." It is interesting that Admiral Turner refers to these agents as people who simply "collect" and "report." He never mentions that they also bribe, steal, blackmail, bomb, threaten, torture and kill, often under the direct supervision of their "controls," the CIA case officers.

Some Other Agents

These are some of the other "sources" discussed by the Director in his affidavit:

"The 'safehouse keeper who must provide a safe haven and secure meeting place.'"


"The courier whose function is to securely transport material even though the contents may be unknown to him."

"Access agents," who introduce potential recruits to the Agency's well-trained recruiters.

"Cut-outs," people who serve as "facades, concealing the fact that the ultimate recipient of information is American intelligence."

An "Overbroad Interpretation"

The judge rejected Turner's approach as an "overbroad interpretation," though he indicated he was sympathetic to the problem. The plaintiffs, meanwhile, ridiculed the Agency's view of classified intelligence sources. Under Turner's definition, they said, the Virginia Electric Power Company would be an intelligence source because it provides electricity for the Agency's headquarters. The CIA Director insisted that the term was not "so vague or imprecise as to shroud whatever the CIA may wish to conceal." Perhaps not, but that seems to describe its desires.



FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND SENATE CONTACT CHARGED IN SCHEME TO DEFEAT CANAL TREATY

In February 1978 a Panamanian immigrant, Alexis Watson Castillo, appeared at a Miami news conference, announcing that he was a former Panamanian intelligence officer and charging that the Torrijos government was corrupt and involved in drug smuggling, gunrunning and prostitution. The press conference was during the heated national debate over the Panama Canal treaties, and was part of a well-coordinated, well-financed, but ultimately unsuccessful campaign to defeat the treaties. Watson Castillo's charges made front page news in the United States.


Recently, in a repudiation scarcely covered by the press, Watson Castillo charged that John Laxalt, the director of Citizens for the Republic and the brother of right-wing

Senator Paul Laxalt (R-Nev), paid him \$6,000 to lie, and promised him resident alien status. He also charged that he was coached in how to lie by retired Army General Daniel O. Graham, the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency and Deputy Director of the CIA, and present spokesman for the hardline American Security Council.

"I lied to the American people. . . because in that moment I have bad situation. . . I need the American residence. . . I need the money," Watson Castillo told ABC. He admitted that he never was an intelligence agent and that his charges more than a year earlier were all untrue. He never did receive residency, and is now back in Panama. Laxalt refused to "dignify" the charges with an answer.

KOMER NAMED UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

President Carter's dedication to human rights is surely exposed by his bringing to high public office the chief architect of the Phoenix Program in Vietnam. Operation Phoenix, by the admission of the CIA and the Thieu government, was responsible for the torture, terror and assassination of over 40,000 Vietnamese civilians from its inception in August 1968 through the middle of 1971. Robert Komer, the man who coordinated the program for the CIA, described in the Associated Press release simply as "a onetime CIA employee who served as special assistant to [President] Johnson," replaced Stanley R. Resor as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.



CIA RECRUITING "EXCEPTIONAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS"

Recent news accounts have all highlighted the failure of the CIA to predict events in Iran, Nicaragua, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The fact is, of course, that the CIA has for a long time been in the business of telling the Administration what it thinks it wants to hear. (This is amply demonstrated by the case of Jesse Leaf, former CIA analyst for Iran, who has publicly protested that his reports condemning the Shah and SAVAK were never routed to the higher levels of policy-making, because the facts were inconsistent with then-current U.S. policy.)

Nevertheless, the quality of the CIA's product has not been highly regarded of late, and the President complained about it publicly after the Shah was forced from his throne. This may explain why the Director of Central Intelligence has commenced a program to lure personnel who deal with "analysis in support of national or departmental intelligence" from other agencies. This is the new, red-white-and-blue *DCI Exceptional Intelligence Analyst Program*.

A recruitment leaflet shared with *CAIB* by an acquaintance unsuccessfully targeted for recruitment promises "the opportunity to design a professional enrichment project of one or two years around their own interest and skills." Rumor has it that this new program is yet another of the Admiral's innovations to bring in "new blood" which are stirring up resentment at Langley. Whether the intelligence product will improve, and whether the other agencies will appreciate this attempt to steal their intelligence experts, remains to be seen.

Central Intelligence Agency

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


A curious news story appears in the May 1979 issue of *The Journal of the U.S. Army Intelligence & Security Command*. Entitled "Southwest Hostile Intelligence Threat," the item notes that this was the "prime topic of discussion during a recent four-state area intelligence conference." The conference "was designed to discuss subjects of common intelligence interest and to improve coordination and liaison among intelligence/security agencies in Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas and Louisiana."

Drawing representatives from each military service's intelligence agency, the State Department, CIA, FBI, INS, and, of all things, the Intelligence Section of the Texas

Department of Public Safety, the gathering "was heralded by the attendees as an excellent opportunity for collectors to meet users and users to meet collectors."

Although it was the "prime topic of discussion," there is no mention of precisely what the "Southwest Hostile Intelligence Threat" might be. Of course, there is only one nation which borders on the area of the conference, Mexico, and this brief and innocuous report in an in-house journal would indicate that Mexico, with its vast and newly-discovered oil reserves and its reasserted pride, is the target not merely of the President and of the CIA, but of all the military intelligence agencies as well. —



DIRTY WORK

The CIA In Western Europe

Edited by Philip Agee and
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UNITED STATES ASSISTS SOUTH AFRICA IN SURVEILLANCE

The *Covert Action Information Bulletin* has uncovered evidence that on at least one occasion the U.S. government discussed with the South African police the providing of technical information in a very specialized field, "fixed and moving physical surveillance procedures and techniques."

The proof is found in a Memorandum of January 14, 1971, secured by *CAIB* in a Freedom of Information Act request. The memorandum, reprinted in full below, is from Paul M. Glenn, the Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria, to the Chief of the Foreign Operations Division, State Department Office of Security.

In Washington, Glenn's request was passed on to the Office of Public Safety (OPS), a program with massive CIA input, which, from 1961 to 1975, under the umbrella of AID, supplied training and equipment to more than 7,300 Third World police officers from 55 countries.

Although we do not possess the correspondence which followed the Glenn memo and the referral to OPS, and cannot therefore be positive that the texts were delivered, the very fact that a ranking U.S. Embassy official would listen, much less be sympathetic to such a request, certainly violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the many United Nations embargoes against the Pretoria regime. It should be noted that the request was made in light of the "remarkably good support from the police which is invaluable to our investigations. . . ."

The Memorandum:

To: Chief, SY/FO
From: RSO, Pretoria, P.M. Glenn
Subject: Request for Professional Texts on Surveillance

This office has received a request from the Headquarters, South African Police, to assist in obtaining a professional treatise—or several—on both fixed and moving physical surveillance procedures and techniques. The reason is to provide additional material for the police training program.

We obtain remarkably good support from the police which is invaluable to our investigations and in planning protective measures for our officials. It would be most helpful if we could come up with useful material. The police have indicated that the texts which they have located on surveillances are too general and they are hoping for something more professional and more informative on the actual techniques.

If a good commercial text is available I am willing to pay, personally, to get it to the police here. I recall a pretty good course years ago at Fort Holabird but I was new then and maybe it is less professional than my memory indicates. Whatever you may be able to do will be greatly appreciated.

cc: RSS, Beirut

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